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THE ILLEGALITY OF THE CONSTITUTION
Richard S. Kay*
There are great seasons when persons with limited powers are justified in exceeding
them, and a person would be contemptible not to risk it.
Edmund Randolph
17871
The central role of the Constitution of 1787 in our constitu-
tional law and scholarship is, of course only natural. The well-es-
tablished and terrible power of judicial review is supported, in the
general understanding, by the belief that the Constitution created,
limited, and defined the institutions of American government. The
power of courts to invalidate government action is accepted only
because the courts are seen as the mouthpiece of the Constitution.
This is the understanding which is taught to every school child2 and
which is pled by every official who bows to a judicial decree insist-
ing that no person is above the law.3 Notwithstanding evidence that
the document itself is often no more than a peripheral feature of
judicial decisionmaking, a constitutional law or a constitutional
scholarship without a Constitution will be unthinkable for a long
time to come.
It seems appropriate, therefore, to investigate the origins of the
constitutional text. When we do, however, a paradox emerges:
This foundation of American legality was itself the product of a
blatant and conscious illegality. But this illegality is indeed a para-
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. This article, in part, is
a revised version of material originally published in Kay, The Creation of Constitutions in
Canada and the United States, 7 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 111 (1984), in which I compared the devel-
opments in the United States in 1787-89 to the constitutional changes in Canada in 1980-82.
The research necessary for that article and this one were supported by the Canada-United
States Law Institute.
1. 1 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 262 (1911).
2. The idea that courts interpret the Constitution in constitutional adjudication "is a
view more frequently expressed by the millions of Americans who stagger through life with-
out the benefit of a modem legal education." Ackerman, The Storrs Lecturers: Discovering
the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1051 (1984).
3. Perhaps the best known example is President Richard Nixon's decision to comply
with court orders demanding production of the White House tapes, a decision which finally
led to his resignation. In turning over the first set after a decision by the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, his lawyer announced, "This President does not defy the
law." R. NIXON, RN: THE MEMOIRS OF RICHARD NIXON 937 (1978).
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dox and not a contradiction. For it is exactly its break with prior
legality that invested the Constitution with the power it still exer-
cises over us and with its, at least formal, primacy in our legal sys-
tem. Moreover, this phenomenon is perfectly general. Every legal
system is governed, at the end, by principles whose authority cannot
be found in law.
I. LEGALITY, LEGITIMACY, AND THE AUTHORITY
OF CONSTITUTIONS
Every legal system sits upon a political bottom. A familiar il-
lustration in the literature of constitutional theory traces, by a pro-
cess of regression, the sources of validity for, say, a city ordinance.
The ordinance is valid because enacted in the manner provided in
the City Charter. The Charter is valid because promulgated in ac-
cordance with the terms of a legislative enabling act. The enabling
act is valid because enacted by the legislature in a way authorized
by the Constitution. At this point, ordinarily, the chain of legality
must stop. The Constitution is binding law, but not because it was
created under the authority of some higher instance of positive law.4
The source of the legal quality of the Constitution-and therefore,
the source of the legal quality of all valid law-must be found in
some phenomenon other than law.
Many have attempted to characterize that phenomenon. Hans
Kelsen wrote of a "basic norm," the validity of which is presup-
posed.5 H.W.R. Wade described it as a matter of political fact.6
H.L.A. Hart gave the matter its most illuminating explanation in
postulating a legal system's rule of recognition. His model will be
the basis for the following discussion. The rule of recognition pro-
vides the ultimate criteria for identifying valid law but is not itself
validated by prior positive law.7 Since this rule of recognition ac-
counts for the binding legal force even of the Constitution, it is
plausible to refer to it as the "preconstitutional" rule.8 In England,
it is often said that the preconstitutional rule is: "What the Queen
in Parliament enacts is law." In the United States the conventional
understanding of the legal system would lead to a preconstitutional
rule which, with respect to federal law, is: "The Constitution, and
4. P. FITZGERALD, SALMOND ON JURISPRUDENCE 111-12 (1966); H. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 103-04 (1961); K. OLIVECRONA, LAW AS FACT 96 (1971); Wade, The
Basis of Legal Sovereignty, 1955 CAMB. L.J. 172, 196.
5. H. KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 46-48, 194-200 (1967).
6. Wade, supra note 4, at 188; see also P. FITZGERALD, supra note 4, at 58-59, 84-87,
111-12.
7. H. HART, supra note 4, at 103-05.
8. See Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 187 (1981).
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what the institutions of the federal government enact, within the
limits and according to the procedures of the Constitution, are
law."9
What creates a preconstitutional rule and the criteria by which
it may be criticized cannot, themselves, be questions of law. O This
is true even though the subject is the character of the legal system.
Indeed, it is just because the question is one of defining the ultimate
control over the rules of law that those rules, themselves, cannot
provide a solution.II For Hart the rule of recognition exists in a
particular legal system only by virtue of its acceptance as such.
While the rule of recognition must be regarded as law by partici-
pants acting within the system (from the "internal" point of view),12
its status as the ultimate rule depends on a finding that the neces-
sary acceptance is present' 3 and can only be confirmed from outside
the legal system.14 That is to say, the establishment and identifica-
tion of the preconstitutional rule must be matters of fact.15
9. The examples cited are, of course, highly simplified. In the United States the failure
of the judiciary, whose determinations are accepted as binding statements of law, simply to
follow the prescriptions and proscriptions of the written Constitution indicate that the text
may provide merely one component of a more complex preconstitutional rule. See Kay,
supra note 8. In any highly developed legel system the preconstitutional rule will be a com-
plex, compound set of criteria. See H. HART, supra note 4, at 92-93; cf Finnis, Revolutions
and Continuity of Law, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 44, 68-69 (2d Ser. 1973).
10. Nonetheless, some commentators have referred to the underlying criteria for valid-
ity of laws as themselves rules of the common law. See W. JENNINGS, THE LAW AND THE
CONSTITUTION 156-63 (5th ed. 1959); Dixon, The Common Law as an Ultimate Constitu-
tional Foundation, 31 AUSTL. L.J. 240 (1957); Slattery, The Independence of Canada, 5 Sup.
CT. L. REV. 369, 379-81 (1983). While this characterization is attractive in that it conforms
with the fact that these criteria commonly show up in judicial decisions, see H. WADE, CON-
STITUTIONAL FUNDAMENTALS 25-40 (1980), it is anomalous in that the common law itself is
ordinarily understood to be subordinate to and alterable by statutory law. That understand-
ing is just one manifestation of the generally accepted view that the common law is a product
of an established legal system. As such it cannot comfortably contain the defining standards
of that system. See Wade, supra note 4, at 186-87; cf P. FITZGERALD, supra note 4, at 58-59,
84-87.
11. See H. HART, supra note 4, at 103-07.
12. See id. at 107-08.
13. See id. at 111-14.
14. Cf. T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 91-93 (1962) (noting
the limited nature of debates accompanying both political and scientific revolutions). On the
insufficiency of the internal point of view in understanding law, see Weisbrod, Looking at
Law, 16 CONN. L.R. 1007 (1984).
15. See H. HART, supra note 4, at 106-07; Postema, Coordination and Convention at the
Foundations of Law, I 1 J. LEG. STUD. 165, 168-69 (1982); Slattery, supra note 10, at 379-81;
Wade, supra note 4, at 188. Hart's emphasis on fact distinguishes his view from Kelsen's
theory of the "Basic Norm." For Kelsen the validity of the ultimate norms of positive law is
supplied by a "Basic Norm," the validity of which is not demonstrated, but presupposed. See
H. KELSEN, supra note 5, at 194-202. The critical difference, for our purposes, is that the
Basic Norm is not grounded in the factual circumstances and behavior of the participants of
the legal system. See id. at 208. Compare H. HART, supra note 4, at 105-06. Kelsen's posi-
tion is a consequence of his insistence on the impossibility of deriving a norm from a fact, an
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When the preconstitutional rule is settled we can productively
inquire into the validity of a rule of law by reference to the precon-
stitutional rule.16 We are then adopting an internal point of view.
Such inquiries will be referred to here as questions of "legality." In
contrast there are periods of profound constitutional doubt and con-
stitutional change. At such times it is the preconstitutional rule it-
self which is in dispute. But since there can be no legally correct
resolution of such disputes, they can be debated only in terms exter-
nal to the legal system. Such discussion will be referred to here as a
question of "legitimacy."
The term "legitimacy" will, therefore, be used in a rather spe-
cial sense. In particular it will denote the acceptability of a precon-
stitutional rule with respect to the attitudes and beliefs of a
particular society. This is in keeping with Hart's notion that the
preconstitutional rule is determined by the attitudes and beliefs of
the participants in the legal system. Claims of the legitimacy of a
preconstitutional rule are, therefore, claims of "fit" between the
preconstitutional rule and the characteristics of the society in-
volved.17 This contextual legitimacy, of course, is an enormously
complex matter. For example, Hart emphasized the critical reflec-
tive attitude of the officials administering the law, in contrast to atti-
tudes in the general population. But "official" and "popular"
attitudes are not independent phenomena. Furthermore, the very
legal system which is at issue may mold as well as be molded by the
underlying social factors. Finally social attitudes and beliefs are the
product of diverse and sometimes contradictory factors-historical,
economic, religious, geographical and so forth. This amalgam of
influences provides the political underpinning on which any legal
system must finally rest.
Any discussion of the legitimacy of a preconstitutional rule
"ought" from an "is." See H. KELSEN, supra note 5, at 193; N. MACCORMICK, H.L.A.
HART 25-26 (1981); J. RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 125-26 (1979). Kelsen's Basic Norm,
therefore, is, as he states, not a tool of ethical-political analysis. It is rather a logical conse-
quence of the existence of a legal sytem. See H. KILSEN, supra note 5, at 9; Kelsen, Professor
Stone and the Pure Theory of Law, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1128, 114243 (1965). The discussion in
the text, which focuses on the ethical-political factors which form the defining characteristics
of a legal system, relies, therefore, on the kind of analysis best explicated by Hart.
16. To some extent that inquiry may be conducted by an examination of the express
rules of the legal system and the statements of its officials. But often such information will be
insufficient either because of a divergence between these artifacts and the actual operation of
the legal system or because verbal formulations are inherently inexact. See H. HART, supra
note 4, at 144-50. In such cases we will need to know more about the way society works
outside the formal machinery of the legal system.
17. This use of the term is similar to that employed by Weber as describing a phenome-
non which is contingent on the facts of an actual society. See M. WEBER, THE THEORY Or
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 124-32 (T. Parsons ed. 1964).
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must involve two aspects-its contents and its origins. Each must
be compatible with the relevant characteristics of the society whose
law it governs. Thus, with regard to content, a society with a uni-
form and strongly rooted tradition of belief in a revealed religion
may require a preconstitutional rule in which the standard of valid
law involves reference to an accepted medium of relevation. But
even the specification of accepted criteria of validity might be insuf-
ficient if the rule issues from what is perceived as a corrupt origin.
Thus, a constitutional system which has substantively adequate
rules of constitutional validity might be incapable of achieving the
necessary respect if its historical source was the edict of a foreign
conqueror. In sum, questions concerning the character of an ex-
isting preconstitutional rule, as well as the probability or propriety
of a change in it, necessarily demand reference to the social organi-
zations, the customs and practices, the history and the moral and
political principles of that group of human beings who are to live
under the system of law which that rule is to define.18
So long as a legal system is in place and generally effective, its
legitimacy ordinarily will be assumed. As soon, however, as the
basis of the system (not just the validity of a particular rule) is
brought into question, issues of legitimacy necessarily arise. This
kind of argument may be of little moment so long as such doubts
are isolated. Occasions may arise, however, when it is fair to say
that a whole society is engaged in critical discussion of the basis of
its law. In those cases the justification and denunciation will appeal
to standards of legitimacy.
When a new preconstitutional rule emerges out of such a pe-
riod it is fair to characterize such change, at least in a narrow sense,
as revolutionary in a way which no change, no matter how substan-
tial, authorized by law can be. Of course this kind of revolution
need involve no tumult or bloodshed. It may even leave undis-
turbed the day-to-day rules and practices of political and legal insti-
18. Legal, like pre-legal, social rules have no common identity or basis of existence
in time save that of the group of human beings which accepts them. In times of
crisis, the lawyer is obliged to admit that his judgments rest on a critical assessment
of the identity of an object which normally he regards as "artificial and anomalous"
and legally barely intelligible-viz, the great "unincorporated society" in which he
lives.
Finnis, supra note 9, at 70.
The meaning given legitimacy, is, it will be noted, something of a catch-all incorporating
all of the inexact non-legal factors which will be relied on in deciding the propriety of a
possible basis of the legal system. It, therefore, does not respond to Prof. Hyde's opposition
between legitimacy on the one hand and other reasons for adhering to a legal system such as
"habit, fear of sanctions, and individual conviction that the requested compliance is in the
actor's interest." Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 Wisc. L.
REv. 379, 388.
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tutions. But it works changes which are literally fundamental in
creating the foundations of law while itself resting on no law.
It was that kind of revolutionary change which occurred in the
United States in 1787-89.
II. THE EVENTS OF 1787-89
A. The Articles of Confederation
The Articles were submitted by the Continental Congress to
the various state legislatures for ratification on November 17,
1777.19 Sixteen months earlier Congress had declared the colonies
to be "free and independent states" having full power to do the
"things which independent states may of right do."20 The Articles
were to have no effect until accepted by every state legislature.
Largely due to differences over various state claims to western
lands, the last state did not approve until March, 1781.21 This rati-
fication brought into being for the first time a legal entity known as
"The United States of America." The Articles were in effect for
eight years until the institution of the new constitutional govern-
ment in 1789.22
The nature of that first constitution was clear from the face of
the document itself. The Articles established a "perpetual" union
of the states and granted some significant, but limited, national
powers to a Congress of state delegates. In Congress, each State
had a single vote, and no important action could be taken without
the assent of nine states. The Articles declared that "[e]ach state
retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every power,
jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this confederation expressly
delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled."23 Any
change of the Articles themselves required the unanimous agree-
ment of the state legislatures.24 The Articles, therefore, while estab-
lishing a substantial federation for its time,25 created not a national
government, in any modern sense, but "a firm league of
friendship."26
19. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY 98 (R. Morris ed. 1961).
20. The Declaration of Independence, para. 32 (U.S. 1776).
21. B. BAILYN, D. DAVIS, D. DONALD, J. THOMAS. R. WIEBE & G. WOOD, THE
GREAT REPUBLIC 302-04 (1977) [hereinafter cited as B. Bailyn, D. Davis).
22. M. JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 239 (1940).
23. Articles of Confederation art. II (U.S. 1781).
24. Id. at art. XIII.
25. Note, The United States and the Articles of Confederation: Drifting Toward Anarchy
or Inching Toward Commonwealth?, 88 YALE L.J. 142 (1978).
26. Articles of Confederation art. III. See B. BAILYN, D. DAVIS, supra note 21, at 302-
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The shortcomings of the Articles have been recounted many
times.27 Although it oversaw important accomplishments in the
successful conclusion of the Revolutionary War and the organiza-
tion of the Northwest Territories, it was, in a literal sense, constitu-
tionally incapable of dealing adequately with the country's
persistent problems. Effective economic policy was frustrated by
the failure to give the Congress authority to tax, to regulate com-
merce or to control credit, and by an inability to deal with the delin-
quency of many states in their financial contributions. With respect
to external relations, the central government was incompetent to
establish national tariff or trade policies, resulting in a serious disad-
vantage in competing or negotiating with other countries. In all of
those matters, the fragmentation of political authority was a major
obstacle to progress. Moreover, the state governments, to which
most important public decisionmaking had been confided, were in-
creasingly inefficient and corrupt, and consequently regarded with
diminished public respect.2 8 In the last years of the 1780's, it was
widely perceived that any solution to these difficulties would involve
a significant augmentation of national power.29
In January, 1786, the Virginia legislature proposed that a con-
vention be held in Annapolis in September, to consider solutions to
the commercial problems plaguing the confederation.30 Only five
states sent delegates. They merely proposed that Congress call an-
other convention to be held in Philadelphia the following spring.
The Philadelphia convention was to consider not just commercial
matters, but "'to devise such further provisions as shall appear to
[the delegates] necessary to render the Constitution of the Federal
Government adequate to the exigencies of the Union.' "31
Partially in response to the argument that such a convention
was contrary to the lawful amendment procedure provided in the
Articles, Congress for a time ignored the request.32 By February,
1787, however, a majority of the states had elected delegates to the
convention. Congress then issued a call for a convention for "the
sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation
and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures such altera-
tions and provisions therein as shall when agreed to in Congress and
27. See e.g., B. BAILYN, D. DAVIS, supra note 21, at 325-29, and the sources cited at
350. But see Note, supra note 25.
28. See B. BAILYN, D. DAVIS, supra note 21, at 325-28.
29. Id. at 329.
30. See M. JENSEN, THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 33 (1964).
31. THE FEDERALIST No. 40, at 258 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); C. BEARD, AN
ECONMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 61-63
(MacMillian Press ed. 1929).
32. See note 37 infra and accompanying text.
19871
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confirmed by the states render the federal constitution adequate to
the exigencies of Government & the preservation of the Union."33
The main features of the events of that extraordinary summer
of 1787 are now well known to every student of American history.
The delegates proposed an entirely new government. Their plan
was not submitted to the state legislatures but was ratified by spe-
cially elected conventions in each state.34 When the ninth state,
New Hampshire, ratified in June of 1788, the Constitution by its
own terms could come into effect. Shortly thereafter, when Virginia
and New York followed suit, the inauguration of the new regime
was assured.35 In the spring of 1789, the new government was or-
ganized, and the Constitution became the supreme law of the
land.36
B. The Legality of the Constituent Process
1. The Convention of 1787
Under the Constitution, the final authority of the state legisla-
tures which underlay the Articles was scrapped. This change was
more than a mere legal revision under a continuing preconstitu-
tional rule. The extra-legal character of the change was understood
even prior to the convention and helps explain Congress's reluctant
participation.37
The same recognition surfaced early in the deliberations of the
convention itself. On May 29, Edmund Randolph of Virginia put
before the convention three resolutions proposing a wholesale re-
placement of the Confederation by a strong national government. 38
As the plan's opponents were quick to point out, the Congressional
resolution calling the convention, as well as the instructions to a
number of state delegations, restricted the convention's mission to
"revising the Articles of Confederation and reporting . . . altera-
tions and provisions therein."39 Randolph's "Virginia Plan" pro-
posed replacement, not revision. To approve the resolution,
therefore, Charles Pinckney of South Carolina argued, would mean
33. 3 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 13-14
(1911).
34. M. JENSEN, supra note 30, at 102-05.
35. Id. at 138-39.
36. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 19, at 121.
37. In his notes on the congressional debates of February 21, 1787, Madison wrote that
objections to the Convention centered in part on the feeling that such a course "tended to
weaken the federal authority by lending its sanction to an extra-constitutional mode of pro-
ceeding." 5 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOP-
TION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 96 (2d ed. 1891).
38. See M. JENSEN, supra note 30, at 39-42.
39. 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 33, at 13-14.
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"their business was at an end."40 William Paterson of New Jersey
warned the delegates that they "ought to keep within [the Articles']
limits, or [they] should be charged by [their] constituents with usur-
pation. . . . [T]he people of America were sharp-sighted and
[would] not be be deceived."41 The objection was put sharply in an
anti-constitutional tract published during the ratification debate:
They [the Convention] had no other authority to act in this matter, than what was
derived from their commissions-when they ceased to act in conformity thereto, they
ceased to be a federal convention, and had no more right to propose to the United
States the new form of government, than an equal number of other gentlemen, who
might voluntarily have assembled for this purpose-The members of the convention
therefore, admitting they have the merit of a work of supererogation, have thereby
inferred no kind of obligation on the States to consider, much less to adopt this plan
of consolidation. The consolidation of the union! What a question is this, to be
taken up and decided by thirty-nine gentlemen who had no publick authority
whatever for discussing it 14 2
In reply, the advocates of the new constitution made a half-
hearted legal argument. Madison asserted that the new government
was not so different from the Confederation government and was a
mere "alteration."43 "The truth is," he later wrote, "that the great
principles of the Constitution proposed by the Convention, may be
considered less as absolutely new, than as the expansion of princi-
ples which are found in the articles of Confederation."44 The criti-
cal legal question, however, was not whether the Constitution was
"absolutely new" but whether it could reasonably be construed as a
"revision" of the prior instrument. On this there is little doubt.
The supporters of the Constitution also sought comfort in the lan-
guage of the Congressional authorization, which had called on the
convention to propose such alterations as would "render the federal
constitution adequate to the exigencies of Government & the preser-
vation of the Union."45 That being the convention's charge, Ran-
dolph argued, "it would be treason to our trust, not to propose what
we found necessary."4 6 Given the deficiencies in the existing gov-
ernment, a delegate to the North Carolina ratifying convention ex-
plained, "[lt was found impossible to improve the old system
40. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at 39.
41. Id. at 178; remarks of E. Gerry, id. at 42-43; remarks of J. Lansing, id. at 249; M.
Jensen, supra note 30, at 42-43, 52-57.
42. The Letters of a "Republican Federalist" in C. KENYON, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS
114 (1966).
43. THE FEDERALIST No. 40, supra note 31, at 260-61.
44. Id. at 262. For a modern argument that there was significant continuity between
the Articles government and the new Federal government, see Note, supra note 25, at 160-65.
45. 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 33, at 14.
46. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note I, at 255.
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without changing its very form."47 However, in light of the strict
and specific language of the congressional call, this liberal interpre-
tation was highly implausible. It is hard to dispute the common
sense of John Lansing's observation that "N[ew] York would never
have concurred in sending deputies . . . if she had supposed the
deliberations were to turn on a consolidation of the States, and a
National Government."48
If the legal argument on behalf of the convention's actions was
unconvincing, other, non-legal justifications would have to be de-
vised. Some supporters of the proposal minimized the importance
of any departure from the legally established procedure on the
ground that the convention's recommendations had no juridical sig-
nificance. Hamilton felt no difficulty because "[w]e can only pro-
pose and recommend-the power of ratifying . . . is still in the
states." 49 The convention, Madison wrote, was "merely advisory
and recommendatory" and its proposal was "of no more conse-
quence than the paper on which it is written."50 This was, of
course, a concession and not a response to the claim of ultra vires.
Other defenders met the accusation more boldly. The conven-
tion's trespass of its legal boundaries was justified by the gravity of
the situation facing the country and the incapacity of existing insti-
tutions to meet it. James Wilson of Pennsylvania, subsequently one
of the nation's first great authorities on constitutional law, told his
fellow delegates at Philadelpia that "[t]he House on fire must be
extinguished, without a scrupulous regard to ordinary rights."51
Similarly, Colonel Mason insisted that in "certain crises. . . all the
ordinary cautions yielded to public necessity."52 He pointed to the
negotiation of the 1783 Treaty with Great Britain, during which the
American envoys had exceeded their powers but in so doing had
"raised to themselves a monument more durable than brass."53 In
47. 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 33, at 351 (remarks ofR.D. Spaight in the North Caro-
lina Convention, July 30, 1788); see THE FEDERALIST No. 40, supra note 31, at 265 M.
DIAMOND, THE FOUNDING OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 23 (1981).
48. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at 249.
49. Id. at 295; to the same effect, see id. at 253 (remarks of J. Wilson).
50. THE FEDERALIST No. 40, supra note 31, at 264. To the same effect was the speech
of Edmund Pendleton in the Virginia Convention: "Suppose the paper on your table dropped
from one of the planets; the people found it, and sent us here to consider whether it was
proper for their adoption; must we not obey them?" 3 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 38 (2d ed.
1891). Similar expressions may be found by Davie and Maclaine in the North Carolina Con-
vention, 4 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 23, 204 (2d ed. 1891).
51. 2 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 469 (1911).
52. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at 338.
53. Id.
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The Federalist No. 40, Madison wrote:
[The delegates] must have reflected, that in all great changes of established govern-
ments, forms ought to give way to substance; that a rigid adherence in such cases to
the former, would render nominal and nugatory, the transcendent and precious
right of the people to "abolish or alter their governments as to them shall seem most
likely to effect their safety and happiness," since it is impossible for the people spon-
taneously and universally, to move in concert towards their object; and it is there-
fore essential, that such changes be instituted by some informal and unauthorized
propositions, made by some patriotic and respectable citizen or number of
citizens. 5 4
"That is," concluded Charles Beard, commenting on this language,
"the right of revolution is, at bottom, the justification for all great
political changes."55
2. The Ratification Process
Quite apart from the legal incapacity of the convention, the
proposed Constitution was itself inconsistent with the existing law
of constitutional change. Article 13 of the Articles of Confedera-
tion, which declared the union to be "perpetual" and in which each
state undertook to observe "inviolably" the Articles, barred any al-
teration unless it "be agreed to in a Congress of the United States,
and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State."56
The convention did not propose an "alteration" consistent with
that Article. It did submit its product to Congress, but not for ap-
proval. Rather it was hoped that Congress would do no more than
transmit the draft to the states. Moreover, under the terms of the
proposed Article VII, state approval was to come not from the leg-
islatures, but from conventions elected especially for the purpose in
each state. Finally, even the state conventions would not have to
approve unanimously. The agreement of nine states would be suffi-
cient to make the Constitution effective "between the States so rati-
54. THE FEDERALIST No. 40, supra note 31, at 265 (quoting the Declaration of Inde-
pendence). James Iredell made the same kind of defense in his argument in the North Caro-
lina convention:
It has been objected, that the adoption of this government would be improper, be-
cause it would interfere with the oath of allegiance to the state. No oath of alle-
giance requires us to sacrifice the safety of our country. When the British
government attempted to establish a tyranny in America, the people did not think
their oath of allegiance bound them to submit to it. I had taken that oath several
times myself, but had no scruple to oppose their tyrannical measures. The great
principle is, The safety of the people is the supreme law.
4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 50, at 229.
55. C. BEARD, supra note 31, at 223; see also id., at 223-25; Palmer, The American
Revolution: The People As Constituent Power, in THE RE-INTERPRETATION OF THE AMERI-
CAN REVOLUTION 1763-1789, at 338, 356-57 (J. Greene ed. 1968).
56. Articles of Confederation art. XIII (U.S. 1781).
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fying."57 This procedure was a clear breach of the perpetual
undertakings of the Articles and was so understood by the new
Constitution's supporters and opponents. It was, asserted one anti-
Federalist in the New York Convention
so flagrant a violation of the public faith of these states, so solemnly pledged to each
other in the Confederation, as makes me tremble to reflect upon; for, however
lightly some may think ofpaper and parchment constitutions, they are recorded, sir,
in that high court of appeals, the Judge of which will do right, and I am confident
that no such violation of public faith ever did, or ever will, go unpunished. 58
One of the most hotly argued issues in Philadelphia was what
form the report of the convention to Congress ought to take. The
ratification article reported by the committee on detail called for the
Constitution to be submitted to the Congress "for their approba-
tion." 59 Since each state cast a single vote in Congress and since
unanimity would doubtless be required, the prospects for this form
of ratification were practically non-existent. The convention
amended the article so to provide simply that the Constitution be
laid before Congress but not for approval or disapproval. Elbridge
Gerry of Massachusetts warned that Congress would take "just um-
brage" at being so casually removed from the constituent process.6o
The majority, however, did not prize legality among its most
important objectives. Indeed the illegality of the process was a good
reason for bypassing Congress. Thomas Fitzsimmons of Penn-
sylvania argued this procedure would "save Congress from the ne-
cessity of an Act inconsistent with the Articles of Confederation
under which they held their authority."61 In the end any embar-
rassing reference to the Congress-or indeed to any of the institu-
tions or rules of the Confederation-was just omitted. Instead the
convention approved a letter to be sent to Congress with the draft
Constitution: "We have now the Honor to submit to the Considera-
tion of the United States in Congress assembled that Constitution
which has appeared to us the most advisable."62 No mention was
made of the power of the convention or the legality of the ratifica-
tion procedure. In both respects the document spoke for itself.
57. U.S. CONsT. art. VII.
58. 2 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 401-02 (2d ed. 1891). (statement of Thomas Tredwell.)
See also Patrick Henry's denunciation in the Virginia Convention of the Constitution's "utter
annihilation of the most solemn engagements of the states." 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 50, at
21.
59. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 51, at 189.
60. Id. at 560. Gerry found an ally in, of all people, Alexander Hamilton.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 583.
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Congress received the proposal three days after the convention
adjourned
with no unseemly expression of pleasure; indeed, as Bancroft says, it had been in
reality invited "to light its own funeral pyre." No body can be expected to decree
gladly its own demise; but there seems to have been no special desire on the part of
the moribund Congress to prolong its own futile life. 6 3
Nevertheless, the opposition voiced in Congress was harsh.
Richard Henry Lee, one of the Constitution's most effective oppo-
nents, denounced the Philadelphia delegates as "monarchy men
• . .aristocrats, and drones" and reminded the Congress that it was
being asked to acquiesce in the "subversion of the constitution
under which they acted." 6 Lee's argument, however, was unsuc-
cessful. And to avoid the unseemliness of "decreeing its own de-
mise," Congress transmitted the Constitution to the state
legislatures without any recommendation.65
The subsequent ratification procedure, calling for the approval
of conventions in nine states, departed from the amending proce-
dure of the Articles in two ways: by eliminating any substantive
role for the legislatures and by dispensing with unanimity. In the
convention Oliver Ellsworth had urged that the Constitution be
treated as an amendment to the Articles to be approved by the state
legislatures. Gouverneur Morris responded directly: Ellsworth's
position "erroneously supposes that we are proceeding on the basis
of the Confederation. This convention is unknown to the Confeder-
ation."66 Similarly, with regard to unanimity, Gerry "urged the in-
decency and pernicious tendency of dissolving in so slight a
manner,... If nine out of thirteen can dissolve the compact, Six
out of nine will be just as able to dissolve the new one hereafter."67
Morris responded again. He agreed that as a matter of law less than
63. A. McLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 198
(1935).
64. M. JENSEN, supra note 30, at 121.
65. Id.
66. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 51, at 92. It was further argued that, since the new
constitution might work some changes in state constitutions, the legislatures which existed
under those constitutions ought not be asked to act inconsistently with them. Id. at 92-93
(remarks of J. Madison).
67. Id. at 561. The impropriety of dissolving the confederation by less than unanimous
consent was also put forward vigorously in the ratification debates. See, e.g., The Address and
Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania to their
Constituents in C. KENYON, supra note 42, at 33 n.1, and the remarks of William Lancaster
in the North Carolina Convention, id. at 415-16. The same idea was also expressed by Wil-
liam Lenoir in the North Carolina Convention in response to the argument that North Caro-
lina would be isolated if it did not ratify: ". . . I would put less confidence in those states.
The states are all bound together by the Confederation, and the rest cannot break from us
without violating the most solemn compact. If they break that, they will this." 4 J. ELLIOT,
supra note 50, at 204.
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unanimous consent of the legislatures under the Confederation was
insufficient. But an appeal to the people outside the established
legal system could alter the federal compact "in like manner as the
Constitution of a particular State may be altered by a majority of
the people of the State."68 Furthermore, since the Constitution
would only bind the states that did ratify, no state would be coerced
into the new system. 69 These responses, of course, did not argue
that the ratification was legal but that it was proper, legal or not. In
The Federalist No. 40, Madison readily conceded the legal necessity
of unanimous agreement under the Articles but suggested that the
requirement was so foolish that he could "dismiss it without further
observation."70
In short, the entire ratification process was undertaken without
legal sanction and, in significant part, in contradiction to law. In
essence, it was an exercise in peaceful revolutionary change.
Charles Beard summarized this point:
If today the Congress of the United States should call a national convention to
"revise" the Constitution, and such a convention should throw away the existing
instrument of government entirely and submit a new frame of government to a
popular referendum, disregarding altogether the process of amendment now pro-
vided, we should have something analogous to the great political transformation of
1787-89. The revolutionary nature of the work of the Philadelphia Convention is
correctly characterized by Professor John W. Burgess when he states that had such
acts been performed by Julius or Napoleon, they would have been pronounced
coups d'etat.7 1
C. The Legitimacy of the Constituent Process
The justifications for revolution, of course, cannot be justifica-
tions of law.72 Rather, they must rely on considerations of justice,
policy, or necessity which outweigh the demands of legality. Suffi-
cient justification of this sort may make the change in legal regime
legitimate in the sense discussed above. For the reasons already
suggested, this legitimacy depends upon the particular values and
traditions of the society involved. By definition, legitimacy can
never be the subject of any authoritative pronouncement by courts
or legislatures.
68. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 51, at 92.
69. Id. at 469 (remarks of J. Madison and J. Wilson).
70. THE FEDERALISr No. 40, supra note 31, at 263; see Dellinger, The Amending Pro-
cess in Canada and the United States: A Comparative Perspective, 45 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 283, 285 (1982).
71. C. BEARD, supra note 31, at 217-18.
72. But see Black, The Constitution of Empire: The Case for the Colonists, 124 U. PA.
L. REV. 1157 (1976); Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in
American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REv. 843 (1978).
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The political actors who brought the Constitution into effect
were well aware of the need for political, non-legal justifications for
their actions. This is not to say that the abandonment of the estab-
lished amending procedures was primarily based on the framers'
appreciation of the jurisprudential underpinnings of constitutional
law. Practical politics was a substantial consideration. The sweep-
ing changes the framers desired simply could not acquire the ap-
proval of every legislature. James Wilson was blunt: "I am not for
submitting the national government to the approbation of the state
legislatures. I know that they and the state officers will opposeit."73
But it would be an injustice to the founding fathers to suggest
that their choice of methods was purely tactical. Their arguments
for replacing congressional and legislative approval with ratification
by popularly elected, ad hoc conventions show that they understood
that their proposed reform was more than just a revision within a
continuing legal system. They knew they were laying the founda-
tion of a new legal system. They were consciously setting out what
they hoped would be a new preconstitutional rule. The debate on
the propriety of the change, therefore, could not be profitably
framed as a question of law. It had to take place, in James Wilson's
words, "upon original principles."74
The original principle upon which the advocates of the Consti-
tution relied was, above all, the sovereignty of the people.75
Although there were differences as to its application, this concept
was the universal dogma of American political thought at the end of
the eighteenth century. On this idea the very independence of the
American nation was founded in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence.76 Wilson, writing in 1791, distinguished the sources of au-
thority on which the British monarchy was said to rest-some
original contract between the king and the people, divine right, or
73. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at 379. See 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 51, at 90
(remarks of N. Gorham); id. at 562 (remarks of 1. Wilson); M. Jensen, supra note 30, at 69.
The political aspects of the ratification procedure were not lost on its opponents. Luther
Martin, in his "Genuine Information" delivered to the Maryland legislature in November,
1787, noted that "the warm advocates of this system, fearing it would not meet with the
approbation of Congress" and legislatures bypassed those bodies in order "to force it upon
them, if possible, through the intervention of the people at large." 3 M. FARRAND, supra
note 33, at 228.
74. 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 33, at 143 (statement in the Pennsylvania Convention).
75. See id. at 142-43; M. JENSEN, supra note 22, at 55.
76. The Declaration recited the "self-evident" truth that governments derive "their just
Powers from the Consent of the Governed" and affirmed the ineradicable "Right of the Peo-
ple to alter or to abolish" their governments and to institute a new one "on such Principles,
and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their
safety and happiness." Declaration of Independence para. 2. (U.S. 1776).
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even "the dark foundations of conquest"-from the only legitimate
source of governmental power in America: "With us, the powers of
magistrates, call them by whatever name you please, are the grants
of the people." 77
The mere invocation of the sovereignty of the people, however,
could not justify bypassing the Congress and the legislatures. Those
institutions, too, could claim the authority of the people. In the late
eighteenth century the classical notion of mixed government com-
posed of institutions representing the different interests in society
had given way to the idea that every organ of government derived
its power solely from the sovereign people.78 How, then, could an
appeal to the people be the basis of an argument for circumventing
their elected representatives? For ordinary decisions of law and
government, the ordinary lawmaking institutions might be adequate
surrogates for the people. But when, in a constituent process, the
character and powers of those institutions themselves were in issue,
it was natural (if not logically necessary) that they be viewed as
defective vehicles for the expression of the popular will.79 The peo-
ple would have to speak with an alternate voice, one which was
independent of, and which would transcend the agencies of govern-
ment which were to be abolished.80
The method for expressing this alternate, constituent voice in
the United States had become obvious by 1787. This was the spe-
cial constitutional convention. The revolution itself had been the
product of ad hoe committees and assemblies.81 While post-inde-
pendence constitution-making in the states had, at first, been the
work of the existing legislatures, the theoretical unsoundness of this
technique was increasingly recognized, and special constitutional
77. Wilson, Lectures on Law, in THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 316-17 (McCloskey
ed. 1967).
78. For a perceptive discussion of the changing nature of the recognized authority for
government in this period in American history, see G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969). The older view was expounded by John Adams
who defended constitutions mixing popular, aristocratic and monarchical elements. The
newer view was exemplified in a criticism of Adams by John Stevens: "Government was not
a balancing of people and aristocracy, but only the distribution and delegation of the people's
political power.... For Stevens the parts of government had lost their social roots. All had
become more or less equal agents of the people." Id. at 584.
79. See id. at 276-81; R. PALMER, THE AGE OF DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION 217
(1966).
80. R. PALMER, supra note 79, at 354-57.
81. See THE FEDERALIST No. 40, supra note 31, at 265; G. WOOD, supra note 78, at
313-31. The spontaneous organization of the people of a community for the purpose oflaying
down the fundamental definition of their government goes back, in American history, as far
as the Mayflower Compact in 1620 and the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut in 1639. See
Arendt, Constitutio Libertatis, in THE RE-INTERPRETATION OF THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION, 1763-1789, at 579 (J. Greene ed. 1968).
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conventions were utilized.82 "It was an extraordinary invention,"
the historian Gordon Wood has written, "the most distinctive insti-
tutional contribution, it has been said, the American Revolution-
aries made to Western politics. It not only enabled the constitution
to rest on an authority different from the legislature's, but it actu-
ally seemed to have legitimized revolution."s3 Revolution had "be-
come domesticated in America."84
The submission of the proposed constitution to special ratify-
ing conventions in the states, therefore, swept away any legal objec-
tion to the Constitution. The people's constituent power was
always held in reserve and could undo whatever legal and govern-
mental systems it had created.
From [the people's] authority the constitution originates: for their safety and felicity
it is established: in their hands it is as clay in the hands of the potter: they have the
right to mould, to preserve, to improve, to refine, and to finish it as they please. If
so; can it be doubted, that they have the right likewise to change it?8 5
82. See G. WOOD, supra note 78, at 276-309, 318-43. Col. George Mason of Virginia
saw a danger to the primacy of any Constitution founded on the exercise of the ordinary
lawmaking powers of the state legislatures. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 51, at 88-89. For
some contemporary observers the element of fiction in the distinction between the people
represented in government and the people represented in convention was evident. Noah
Webster asked what was special about a convention. It was only "'a body of men chosen by
the people in the same manner they choose members of the Legislature, and commonly com-
posed of the same men; but at any rate they are neither wiser nor better. The sense of the
people is no better in a convention, than in a legislature.'" (Quoted in G. WOOD, supra at
379.)
83. G. WOOD, supra note 78, at 342.
84. R. PALMER, supra note 79, at 231. See C. BEARD, supra note 31, at 222-25;
Corwin, The Worship of the Constitution in I CORWIN ON THE CONSTITuTIoN 47, 55 (Loss
ed. 1981); Dellinger, supra note 70, at 289-90.
To the operation of these truths we are to ascribe the scene, hitherto unparalleled,
which America now exhibits to the world-a gentle, a peaceful, a voluntary, and a
deliberate transition from one constitution of government to another. In other parts
of the world, the idea of revolutions in government is, by a mournful and indissolu-
ble association, connected with the idea of wars, and all the calamities attendant on
wars. But happy experience teaches us to view such revolutions in a very different
light-to consider them only as progressive steps in improving the knowledge of
government, and increasing the happiness of society and mankind.
2 J. ELLIOT supra note 58, at 432-33 (statement of James Wilson in the Pennsylvania Conven-
tion.) See also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403 (1819) ("[The people]
acted upon it in the only manner in which they can safely, effectively, and wisely, on such a
subject, by assembling in Convention.")
85. Wilson, supra note 77, at 304. See also Wilson's comment in the Pennsylvania rati-
fying convention: "As our constitutions are superior to our legislatures, so the people are
superior to our constitutions. Indeed, the superiority, in this last instance, is much greater;
for the people possess over our constitutions control in act, as well as right." 2 J. ELLIOT,
supra note 58, at 432. Compare the argument of Luther Martin against the legitimacy of
ratification by ad hoe conventions:
[O]nce the people have exercised their power in establishing and forming themselves
into a State government, it never devolves back to them, nor have they a right to
resume or again to exercise thatpower, until such events take place as will amount to
a dissolution of their State government .... [The proposed ratification procedure]
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On this view, the failure to follow established forms ceased to be a
defect. It was, instead, the greatest virture of the ratification pro-
cess. Hamilton wrote in The Federalist No. 22:
It has not a little contributed to the infirmities of the existing federal system, that it
never had a ratification by the PEOPLE. Resting on no better foundation than the
consent of the several Legislatures; it has been exposed to frequent and intricate
questions concerning the validity of its powers; ... and has in some instances given
birth to the enormous doctrine of a right of legislative repeal. . . . The possibility
of a question of this nature, proves the necessity of laying the foundations of our
national government deeper than in the mere sanction of delegated authority. 8 6
The new Constitution would be approved by the people themselves
and their "approbation [would] blot out antecedent errors and
irregularities."87
Of course it is possible to discern some distance between the
abstract idea of the consent of the people and the actual ratification
procedure in state conventions. Even if we put aside our modem
conviction that the definition of "the people" ought not to be re-
stricted by considerations of race, sex and wealth,88 significant ques-
tions remain about the results of 1787-89. It seems clear there was
some chicanery in the process.89 Estimates of the proportion of the
population actually favoring the Constitution are largely guesswork
but most observers agree that the division was a close one.90
These real questions, however, are largely beside the point,
which is the extent to which the ratification process contributed to
the legitimacy of the new Constitution. The debate on the Constitu-
tion was a truly national one and, for the intelligence and intensity
which the opposing sides brought to it, was remarkable for any time
has a tendency to set the State governments and their subjects at variance with each
other, to lessen the obligations of government, to weaken the bands of society, to
introduce anarchy and confusion, and to light the torch of discord and civil war
throughout this continent.
L. Martin, "Genuine Information" in 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 33, at 230 (emphasis in
original). Thirty years later Chief Justice Marshall responded summarily to this position in
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404 (1819), in which Luther Martin was
counsel for the State: "It has been said that the people had already surrendered all their
powers to the State sovereignties, and had nothing more to give. But, surely, the question
whether they may resume and modify the powers granted to government does not remain to
be settled in this country."
86. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 145-46 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Madison
made the same point in the Virginia Convention. 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 50, at 94.
87. THE FEDERALIST No. 40, supra note 31, at 233 (J. Madison). See G. WOOD, supra
note 78, at 533-34.
88. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUsT 6 (1980).
89. See J. MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION 1781-88, at
187-248 (1961).
90. See id. at 249; C. BEARD, supra note 31, at 237-38; M. JENSEN, supra note 30, at
138-46.
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and place.91 That debate culminated in the state conventions,
which were perceived as the best devices available for approximat-
ing the popular will. The result was that the Constitution was re-
garded as the product of a process in which the ultimate source of
legitimacy, the sovereignty of the people, was expressed as fully and
as clearly as the accepted political beliefs and institutions of the
time allowed.92
III. THE LEGITIMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION
OVER TIME
As used here, legitimacy turns on the acceptability of the sub-
stance and origins of a preconstitutional rule to participants in the
legal system. Furthermore, that acceptability is always a current
acceptability. The legitimacy of the Constitution of the United
States in 1987 cannot be debated on the limited basis of the events
and circumstances of 1787-89 without considering attitudes and
values in the United States in 1987. A Constitution which we can
be reasonably sure was immune to a claim of illegitimacy in the
tenth year of its existence may, because of changed perceptions, be
cogently attacked as illegitimate in its hundredth year.
None of this is to say that the circumstances surrounding the
promulgation of constitutional rules are irrelevant to disputes about
legitimacy. The participants in a legal system will judge the accept-
ability of its fundamental rule, partly, on the basis of their under-
standing of the propriety of the process that brought it about. Thus
a basic rule, understood to originate in divine revelation, may main-
tain its legitimacy only as long as the underlying religion thrives.
When that underlying belief dissolves, either some other justifica-
tion for accepting the rule will develop or the rule will no longer
govern the legal system.93
Several factors determine the likelihood of such criticism.
First will be the probability that the procedure which gave birth to
the constitutional regime will be regarded (or remembered) as ap-
91. See M. JENSEN, supra note 30, at 122; J. MAIN, supra note 89 passim.
92. The rapidity with which the Constitution came to be accepted shows the conformity
of the ratification process with the political values of the period. See notes 115-124 infra and
accompanying text.
93. This is another way of saying that a new legal system has been established. The
old" preconstitutional rule is, then, no more than a historical artifact. See H. HART, supra
note 4, at 117. In the terminology used in the text, a constitutional rule based on it would be
subject to charge of illegitimacy, although its formal legality remained unimpaired. The
evolution of Canada from a dependency of the United Kingdom to an independent nation
with an ill-defined but clearly internal locus of sovereignty, without changing the formal rules
governing the legal systems illustrates this phenomenon. See Kay, The Creation of Constitu-
tions in Canada and the United States, 7 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 111, 137-41 (1984).
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propriate. Beyond that, however, the content of the rules must
maintain a minimum fit with the social requirements of the soci-
ety.94 At some point even a rule promulgated in a manner still
deemed unexceptionable will fail to satisfy the practical demands
made upon the legal system, creating doubts as to its legitimacy in
the context of new social and political facts.95
Moreover, the legitimacy of a given constitutional regime will,
in some measure, be generated by its own momentum. That is, a
given fundamental constitutional rule will be accepted simply by
virtue of its acknowledged status over time. In such cases, the
events which generated it may acquire respectability from the Con-
stitution instead of the other way around.96 So long as constitu-
tional arrangements perform their function fairly well, roughly
coincide with the values and needs of the society, and are not per-
ceived as originating from an affirmatively perverse source, their le-
gitimacy is unlikely to be seriously questioned.97 The costs of a
major revision of the underlying political premises of a legal system
are so substantial that such a process will not be undertaken fre-
quently.98 The authors of the Declaration of Independence were
94. See Postema, supra note 15, at 178.
95. This will more certainly be the case if the preconstitutional rule provides static,
inflexible criteria of validity as would be the case when it specifies conformity to an unamend-
able written constitution. Whether a radically amended constitution could be defended as
legitimate under the same standard of legitimacy as earlier versions is a difficult question,
particularly when the earlier amending formula is itself altered. See Ross, On Self-Reference
and a Puzzle in Constitutional Law, 78 MIND 1 (1969).
96. Olivecrona suggests that the Roman legal system was founded originally on a pre-
sumed religious obligation:
Over a period of several hundred years great changes in the psychological basis of
the constitution necessarily took place. When government has been carried on for a
long time according to a set of rules, such rules are supported by habits of thought
and many other factors. The old creed may be undermined and the ritual acts
reduced to mere formalities; but for numerous reasons respect for rules may never
the less be upheld and the forms reverently observed.
K. OLIVECRONA, supra note 4, at 103. Cf W. LEDERMAN, CONTINUING CANADIAN CON-
STITUTIONAL DILEMMAS 32-33 (1981); Hyde, supra note 18, at 411.
97. See Postema, supra note 15, at 178-189.
98. The existing Constitution acquires a presumption in its favor merely by being the
status quo. Thus, Dicey believed that it was only changes in the Constitution which ought to
be referred to the extraordinary judgment of the people:
It is I think of immense importance that people should realise that a small & transi-
tory political majority, though it necessarily exercises the powers, has not the au-
thority of the nation.... [O]n matters of constitutional change I do not think a
small majority has any moral right to act with vigour. The presumption is in favor
of the existing state of affairs, because on the whole it may be assumed to be the
permanent will of the nation. Add to this that a constitutional change once made is,
or ought to be, final, and therefore ought not to be made by any body of men who
do not clearly represent the final will of the nation.
A.V. Dicey to L. Maxse, Jan. 1, 1895, quoted in R. COSGROVE, THE RULE OF LAW: AL-
BERT VENN DICEY, VICTORIAN JURIST 161 (1980). In a more practical sense the persistence
of a constitution over time is sure to result in the entrenchment of interests that will present
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undoubtedly right in claiming that "all Experience hath shewn, that
Mankind are more disposed to suffer, while Evils are sufferable,
than to right themselves by abolishing the Forms to which they are
accustomed."99
Although the Constitution was concededly illegal in its incep-
tion and ratification, its authority was justified on the basis of the
political sanction provided by the approval of "the people."100 But
given the ferocity of the ratification debate, a contemporary ob-
server surely would have been skeptical about the prospects for
long-term general acceptance. Governor Clinton of New York was
not particularly extreme in his criticism when he charged that the
Constitution was "founded in usurpation."1o1 The claim was not
infrequently made that the Constitution was the result of a conspir-
acy by the wealthy to betray the Revolution and impose an aristo-
cratic government.10 2 "If we are to listen to the participants," one
commentator has written, "the struggle over the Constitution was a
dispute between contending social interests over a question no less
vital than the future of republican government in America and the
world." 103 Given this level of argument, given the questionable tac-
tics often used in the ratifying conventions,104 and given the close-
ness of the result in some of the critical states, 105 it is something of a
wonder that the Constitution was soon embraced, not grudgingly,
but often with near veneration by the very people who had so vio-
lently denounced it. 106 The issue of legitimacy rapidly disappeared.
obstacles to any serious reconsideration. This tendency, of course, is accentuated when the
same political interests are the most likely initiators of constitutional change. See Cairns, The
Politics of Constitutional Conservatism, in AND No ONE CHEERED: FEDERALISM, DEMOC-
RACY & THE CONSTITUTION ACT 28, 40-43 (K. Banting & R. Simeon eds. 1983).
99. Declaration of Independence, para. 2. (U.S. 1776). The factors referred to in the
text, therefore, involve a rought combination of what Weber described as the "legal" and
"traditional" bases of legitimacy. See M. WEBER, supra note 17, at 324-29, 382-86.
100. See notes 74-86 supra and accompanying text.
101. Quoted in M. JENSEN, supra note 30, at 145.
102. See L. BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION: EVOLUTION OF A PARTY
IDEOLOGY 115 (1978). The complete writings of the Antifederalists have recently been com-
piled in seven volumes. THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST (H. Storing ed. 1981). A useful
collection of such writings is THE ANTIFEDERALISTS, supra note 42. One writer has com-
mented that "the ratification controversy was a struggle between contending social interests,
calling forth an intensity of rhetoric seldom equalled in American disputes." L. BANNING,
supra, at 105.
103. See Banning, Republican Ideology and the Triumph of the Constitution 1789 to
1793, 31 WM. & MARY Q. 167 (1974).
104. See generally J. MAIN, supra note 89, at 187-248.
105. See id. at 249; C. BEARD, supra note 31, at 237-38.
106. The quick apotheosis of the American Constitution was a phenomenon with-
out parallel in the western world. Nowhere has fundamental constitutional change
been accepted with so much ease. Nowhere have so many fierce opponents of a
constitutional revision been so quickly transformed into an opposition that claimed
to be more loyal than the government itself.
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There were several reasons for the quick acceptance of the
Constitution. For all its defects the ratification process stimulated
as extensive and thorough a national debate as was then possible.
And the approval of the state conventions was also-again in the
context of those times-about as democratic a procedure as could
be devised. Thus, the practically universal recognition of the ulti-
mate sovereignty of the people provided a powerful reason for ac-
cepting the people's verdict and getting on with other national
business.107 Furthermore, the actual governmental arrangements
which the new Constitution established were not so radical as to
place them outside of generally accepted notions of republican gov-
ernment.108 Consequently, despite the antifederalists' protestations
to the contrary and the vehemence of their arguments, the differ-
ences as to the manner in which the new Constitution was created
and its main features, were not differences of deep principle.109
Furthermore, once the constitutional government was in place,
its advantages relative to reasonably possible alternatives must have
been seen rather differently. One historian has argued that the
classical political orientation of the antifederalist statesmen resulted
in a conviction that constitutional changes were always for the
worse, so the protection of liberty now depended on a scrupulous
adherence to the newly established constitutional rules.lo
Banning, supra note 103, at 168. See Elkins & McKitrick, The Founding Fathers: Young
Men of the Revolution, in THE RE-INTERPRETATION OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION,
1783-1789, at 379-95 (J. Greene ed. 1968). The collapse of the Antifederalist position is
illustrated by the case of Luther Martin of Maryland, a member of the Constitutional Con-
vention who denounced the new Constitution savagely in the subsequent ratification debate,
see note 85 supra, and who, shortly afterwards, became known as the Federalist "bull-dog."
See Roche, The Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action, in THE RE-INTERPRETATION
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1763-1769, at 437, 466 (J. Greene ed. 1968); Schechter,
The Early History of the Tradition of the Constitution, 9 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 707 (1915).
107. The Declaration of Independence had not been ratified at all, and the Articles
of Confederation had been ratified by the various state legislatures. The Constitu-
tion, however, was submitted for ratification to "the people themselves," actually to
"popular ratifying conventions" elected in each state. A few spoilsports pointed out
that this was not significantly more "democratic" than submitting the documents to
the legislatures (since the conventions themselves would necessarily be representa-
tive bodies and much the same cast would likely be chosen as the people's represent-
atives). But the symbolism was important nonetheless.... It is also instructive that
once the Constitution was ratified virtually everyone in America accepted it imme-
diately as the document controlling his destiny. Why should that be? Those who
had opposed ratification certainly hadn't agreed to such an arrangement. It's quite
remarkable if you think about it, and the explanation has to be that they too ac-
cepted the legitimacy of the majority's verdict.
J. ELY, supra note 88, at 5-6 (1980); see L. BANNING, supra note 102, at 106; M. DIAMOND,
supra note 47, at 54; Banning, supra note 103, at 169.
108. See Banning, supra note 103, at 169.
109. See L. BANNING, supra note 102, at 106; Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 106, at
395.
110. See Banning, sup, a note 103, at 177-87.
ILLEGAL CONSTITUTION
Whatever the precise reasons, perceptions changed once the Consti-
tution achieved the privileged position of status quo. Now the bur-
den of proof on the question of legitimacy would rest on those who
would challenge the existing regime. In that sense the Constitution
became more secure with every year.
Of course, the Constitution was to suffer more than one chal-
lenging jolt in the subsequent course of American history. Most
obvious is the national cataclysm of the Civil War from which the
Constitution emerged significantly changed. But in the critical de-
bates leading up to the war, proponents of each position often
grounded their arguments in an interpretation of the Constitu-
tion.I Even secession itself was sometimes justified as consistent
with the constitutional scheme of 1787.112 That question of consti-
tutional construction having been settled by the war, the nominal
legitimacy of the Constitution was, if anything, enhanced.113 Fur-
thermore, reverence for the constituent process was, and continues
to be, a significant part of the regard which the Constitution enjoys.
Serious, and occasionally violent, constitutional differences have oc-
curred but these are matters arising within a professed common al-
legiance to what is almost universally declared to be the binding law
of the Constitution. Its authority has been treated as Jefferson
found it treated in France in the debates of the National Assembly,
"like that of the Bible, open to explanation, but not to question."14
"The divine right of kings never ran a more prosperous course than
did the unquestioned prerogative of the Constitution to receive uni-
versal homage."115
111. See H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT 1835-1875, at 115-231 (1982). This is not to say that certain participants did
not, sometimes, reject wholesale the authority of the Constitution. While some abolitionists
attempted a constitutional argument against slavery, see R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 154-
58 (1975), other denounced the Constitution and its rather explicit protection of slavery. See
id. at 150-54.
112. See H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK, supra note 111, at 208-15. In his inaugural address
to the Confederate Provisional Congress in February 1861, Jefferson Davis cited the Declara-
tion of Independence but also insisted that the secession and formation of a new southern
government had "not proceeded from a disregard on our part of just obligations, or any
failure to perform every constitutional duty." It was only "by abuse of language that their
act has been deemed a revolution." JEFFERSON DAVIS AND THE CONFEDERACY AND TREA-
TIES CONCLUDED BY THE CONFEDERATE STATES WITH INDIAN TRIBES 10 (R. Gibson ed.
1977). An explicit post-war refutation of this position is Texas v. White, 74 (7 Wall.) U.S.
700 (1868).
113. See Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE L.J. 1290, 1303-05 (1937).
114. Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 28, 1789), reprinted in 3 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 96, 99 (H. Washington ed. 1871); see Monaghan, Our Perfect Consti-
tution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 356-57 (1981), and sources cited in id. at 356 nn.23-24.
115. Corwin, The Worship of the Constitution, supra note 84, at 47 (quoting Woodrow
Wilson). See Cahow, Comparative Insights into Constitutional History: Canada, The Critical
Years, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 40-42 (1982); Hamilton, Constitutionalism, in 2
1987]
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The main point to be learned from an examination of the be-
ginnings of the Constitution, is not the fitness of one or another
preconstitutional rule. On the contrary, it shows that we cannot
settle on a correct position in this regard as a matter of law or logic.
The creation of, or change in, the preconstitutional rule will reflect
the needs and values of the time in which it is effective and will
draw its legitimacy from its conformity with those needs and values.
And since that legitimacy is always a current matter, any preconsti-
tutional rule is always provisional, subject to change when social
and political factors require it. The great change of 1787-89 was
obvious because it involved an alteration of both the preconstitu-
tional rule and the formal accouterments of that rule, the Articles of
Confederation and the institutions of government created under it.
Similar changes which leave the formal aspects of the legal system
untouched may not command our attention in the same way but
they surely occur.' 16 It is the possibility of such changes that makes
sensible our continuing discussion about constitutional fundamen-
tals. In this respect we are always in a situation like the one that
confronted the founders in 1787-89.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 255 (1937); Monaghan, supra note 114. Of
course, the occasional, idiosyncratic attack on the legitimacy of the Constitution is not un-
known in American history. See L. SPOONER, No TREASON: THE CONSTITUTION OF No
AUTHORITY (1870, reissued 1973).
116. Professor Ackerman suggests that there have been three critical constitutional turn-
ing points in American history in which, by virtue of extraordinary popular participation, the
underlying constitutional rules were "legitimately" changed. These are: 1) the Constitution
of 1787-89 and its entrenchment in the period of the Marshall Court, 2) the Civil War and the
Civil War Amendments, and 3) the capitulation of the Old Court in 1937 to the welfare state
initiated by the New Deal. See Ackerman, supra note 2, at 1051-71. Only the first of these
involved simultaneous formal and substantive changes. The adoption of the Civil War
amendments might also be so classified given their rather blatant departure from the process
prescribed by Article V. See id. at 1063-69.
